BEHDINAN – The assessment written by KCK Executive Council Member Sabri Ok for the ANF regarding the 15 August Initiative is as follows:
As in all revolutionary histories, there are firsts in the history of the Kurdistan revolution. There are beginnings that change the current destiny, stop the bad course and are decisive. These beginnings left their mark on history and defeated the bad luck of the peoples. If these steps are not taken and the desired beginnings are not realized, the course of history will be on a completely different course. The PKK movement has come to the stage of history to put a stop to this bad trend, to change the current fate and to rewrite history. With the 15 August Initiative, the PKK movement became a new beginning for the Kurds and the people of Kurdistan, and the beginning of the end against the genocidal-colonial Turkish state’s policies of destruction.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AUGUST 15 DEVELOPMENT
Leader Apo says that every pressure and force applied in Kurdistan from the beginning has led to the development of new waves of resistance. This is actually the dialectic of development of both our people’s and our party’s history. This has always been the case in our history of struggle. As the resistance and struggle developed, colonial oppression and force increased, and there was always a strong resistance and better organization in the face of increasing colonial oppression and force. In Kurdistan, there is a past, a ground on which the 15 August Initiative is based. The 15 August process was not entered spontaneously, unpreparedly and unequipped, on the contrary, the preparations for this, which we call the recovery and reorganization process, started from abroad and continued uninterruptedly until ’84, and all organizational, political and practical work essentially served this,
It is obvious that the cadres are prepared for this in terms of material and moral, intellectual, educational, military and physical aspects during this period.
The ideological struggle, which was the tactic of the period that Leader Apo developed while weaving the foundations of the struggle, together with the struggle against the civil fascist forces and the collaborator comprador forces, made the colonial state think deeply even then and led him to develop new measures and new policies. In this sense, the martial law was actually implemented to prevent the development of our movement, and even to liquidate it if possible. Indeed, there were intense arrests. In fact, almost all of our party’s leading cadres were arrested before September 12.
WITHDRAWAL TO THE MIDDLE EAST WAS A STRATEGIC DECISION
In this process, Hilvan and Siverek practices were truly magnificent. It was a very determined and ambitious struggle against colonialism and their collaborators. Although their amateurism was high, its democratic and national libertarian dimension both deeply and rapidly affected the people. Indeed, even then it was causing a national awakening. When the movement grew rapidly, the genocidal colonialist Turkish state, which saw that the Martial Law was not enough, turned to the fascism of September 12. The fascism of September 12 was a new process not only for our party but for all revolutionary forces. The leading cadres of our movement were captured. It was clear what kind of strategy and tactics the enemy would come upon us. Leader Apo quickly realized this and developed measures accordingly. When the military coup of September 12, 1980 took place, all left groups suffered a strategic coup. The PKK was beginning a new and more hopeful era. That’s why the withdrawal tactic was used.
The withdrawal tactic was important to us. First, it was important that we chose to withdraw to the Middle East, where there was a hot struggle. It was also an expression of determination in the struggle. At the same time, solidarity with the Palestinian people expressed the international character of our movement. And most importantly, it was to carry out comprehensive evaluations of our struggle against September 12 fascism in terms of ideological, political, organizational and tactical. Even then, with the decision taken at the 1st Conference and 2nd Congress of our party, a strategically important tactical move was initiated. All the preparations, all the struggle, all the training was on it.
INSPIRATION FROM VIETNAM
In this process, the history of Kurdistan was examined. Why did the resistances in Kurdistan not last long? For example, giving premature birth to the Şêx Seîd rebellion, bringing Seyid Rıza into a conspiracy, etc. discussions and inferences have developed. Inspiration and lessons were tried to be learned in the examples of world revolution. Vietnam was a very hot revolution. It retained its warmth, importance and influence. We studied the Vietnamese revolution, we really focused on it.
For example, with the August 15 Initiative, it should be noted in terms of evaluation or comparison. In 1968 there was a revolutionary move known as the Tet offensive in South Vietnam. As it is known, North Vietnam was liberated in 1954. But the war in South Vietnam continues for many years. The Tet offensive in 1968 has actually always been described as a turning point or the beginning of an end. It is a great attack, thousands of revolutionaries took part in the war. It is a move that took months to prepare. It was carried out against the American occupying forces. It’s a big move and results taker. It played a role in determining the direction of the developments and accelerating the process, as it struck the invading forces. As a matter of fact, within 2-3 years, the American forces left Vietnam completely, and the struggle resulted in the victory of the Vietnamese revolution.
There is also Mao’s long march. Mao is best known for him. This is where tactical mastery and depth come from. Again, the Cuban revolution, more specifically, the ambush of Fidel Castro and his friends while they were trying to enter Cuban territory in 1956, after they studied in Mexico, clashed with the Batista forces, suffered great losses, over a hundred groups, but the last 12 forces remained is a beginning. The activities of this 12-person core power brought the Cuban revolution with it. Within two years, the Cuban revolution in 1958 took place. Of course, all of these are examples of struggle and revolution abroad that we gain strength and evaluate.
15 AUGUST PREPARATIONS
Even then, we discussed armed propaganda in the long-term people’s war strategy. Such a move was necessary. The important thing was the decision. This decision was taken at the 2nd Congress of our party. Mehmet Karasungur, who determined the direction of the process and managed the process, together with Egîd friend, played a decisive role in the implementation of this, the pioneering command role, and again in settling and setting up in the country’s territory. They had already gone to the country’s territory before they even attended the 2nd Congress. They were based in Bashure Kurdistan, Zagros. These guys were preparing. After the Congress, it was necessary to develop the war and the resistance. All preparations would be accordingly. But before that, many of our friends and we had such emotional thoughts and approaches from time to time that did not fully understand the depth and role of the process. Leader Apo, however, is always deeper, would address and evaluate problems in a more strategic way. I remember; When martyrdoms took place in the Amed Dungeon, the trend that developed in many friends, and even in the individual reports they developed verbally and in writing, were friends who suggested hijacking -it was a famous act at that time- as seen in the Palestinian example at that time-, suicide acts, sacrifice-type actions -these actions were a very important measure in the example of the Palestinian revolution. was happening. The party saw all this as important. He evaluated it as a revolutionary resistance, a spirit. But it was known how the old rebellions ended in Kurdistan. The same practice should not have been repeated in the person and practice of the PKK. In other words, a more organized, more strategic and more prepared move was needed. That’s what it was all for. I remember; When martyrdoms took place in the Amed Dungeon, the trend that developed in many friends, and even in the individual reports they developed verbally and in writing, were friends who suggested hijacking -it was a famous act at that time- as seen in the Palestinian example at that time-, suicide acts, sacrifice-type actions -these actions were a very important measure in the example of the Palestinian revolution. was happening. The party saw all this as important. He evaluated it as a revolutionary resistance, a spirit. But it was known how the old rebellions ended in Kurdistan.
After the 1982 August Congress, the groups gradually turned to the mountains of Kurdistan. As we stated in these preparations, the role of Mehmet Karasungur and friend Egîd was decisive. The first groups were mostly based in Lolan. Although some friends stayed at some other points along the border, Lolan was the central place where they were based. All training and preparations at Lolan in the winter of 1983 were geared towards developing a revolutionary move. Comrade Şahin Lider had a brochure and evaluations on armed propaganda. The friends who reached Bashure Kurdistan were those who could take on the responsibilities of the process. According to him, discussions and trainings continued. There were also trainings and discussions on armed propaganda. The first armed propaganda directing was already prepared at that time. Our struggle tactic would be with armed propaganda. Maybe it wouldn’t exactly match the Vietnam example, but somehow it would be adapted to the conditions of Kurdistan. For this purpose, the most strategic places in Kurdistan, the places where patriotism is strongest, the places and areas where the geography is most suitable for armed struggle would be taken as a basis.
AT THE EARLY 1984 THE POWERS ARE AGAINST
Those groups that were limited to three or five friends in the first place we mentioned, undoubtedly, were told about the situation in Kurdistan, especially the practices of September 12 fascism, the resistance against it in the dungeons, mostly Mazlums, Kemals, Hayri, and Four. When it was said that we will develop the armed struggle and the revolution with a strategic move in Kurdistan, the people couldn’t help but think, “Is this possible or not?” Will history repeat itself as it has done so far? Is it really achievable? There was a situation in which he approached with suspicion because the people did not believe. At that time, it was not possible to influence the society much. For example, the Botan area was an area not unfamiliar with weapons. Even the tribes were more armed and more numerous than our groups of three or five friends. Therefore, their ability to be an authority was still weak. In fact, a patriotic Koçer made the following suggestion to our friends: “You can’t go far with your style. You cannot create the developments you think and design. We have the weapons in your hands. You are three or five people, but our tribe or other tribes are more crowded. Therefore, you are not in a position to be an authority. If you want to convince the public, to be an authority, to create a psychology on the enemy, go press Perwari, go press another county. It may be an hour, it may be a day, you will have it in your hands. Then your voice will spread everywhere, you will be recognized. Those who love you will be with you, those who are afraid of you and those who are not with you will be a little afraid and afraid. So your dominance grows”. Undoubtedly, these were the correct conclusions that life drew from its own experience. So it was. Those first armed propaganda units, small units, were not really able to exert much influence and weight on society, except as a simple observer for preparations and some territorial control.
For this reason, at the beginning of 1984, the forces were wanted to be reunited and the current situation was wanted to be evaluated. Abbas friend was more interested in this process. Groups inside also came to Bashur. There were already decisions and evaluations in our management meetings. The preliminary studies were sufficient. It would be repetitive to insist more and continue the same work with small groups of three or five people. It could even regress the movement and the move we are considering, it would have a negative effect. The studies carried out allowed to take some bigger targets, some more effective steps, it was sufficient. For this purpose, an intervention or a new process was initiated in the practice of the country, namely the Bakur practice, with a more organized and more crowded group of friends.
HRK ACTUALLY OCCURRED DURING THIS PERIOD
It was on this basis and in this period that the first armed propaganda groups were formed. 14 July Armed Propaganda Unit was sent to today’s Botan area. March 21 Armed Propaganda Unit was sent mostly to Hakkari and Şemdinli regions, and May 18 Armed Propaganda Unit was sent to Çatak-Van region. The organization of an army core from these three Armed Propaganda Units is actually an army core in this period when the army is seen as a target in these studies and the forces are formed. But it was not made public.
The HRK, which we later called Hêzên Rizgariya Kurdistan (Kurdistan Liberation Units), was actually formed during this period. These teams entered into a work in accordance with the armed propaganda activities in their field of duty. Later, it was announced to the public that they joined forces and organized as HRK with the well-known 15 August breakout. This means that our organized armed propaganda work took a more qualified form in April and May 1984 as a result of the 1983 activities.
Our basic organization was armed propaganda, and our main working style was armed propaganda. The organization of our armed propaganda forces consisted of three teams. Each unit consists of three squads. He had a commander and his assistant. Armed propaganda has three main tasks: First, to bring party organizations to the country, to fill the political-organizational vacuum created during the withdrawal period. To create the minimum organizational conditions of the party in the country. Latter; to create the ground for the guerrilla, to prepare the minimum conditions for the start of the armed struggle, to develop relations with the people, to establish bases, to gather intelligence and provide logistics, to explore the country, to determine the main and secondary areas to rely on, etc. can be sorted. Third; creating the minimum conditions for front organization, to reach the masses with the activities it will carry out and to establish political activity in the public. To create the conditions for bringing the people together within the National Liberation Front, to reflect the guerrilla actions to be developed for this to the public in the form of propaganda and agitation, and to gather the people in the ranks of the revolutionary struggle; thus, creating the minimum conditions for front organization in which different classes and layers can take place, and organizing the emerging relations.
ARMED PROPAGANDA WITH GUERILLA STYLE
In addition, although the main task is not to develop armed actions, it is also among the duties to destroy the limited number of enemy forces when possible, and to punish the agents and informers who hinder the development. But their main duties are to carry out their work in preparation for bases, organization and armed struggle. Therefore, the party is responsible for bringing the national liberation policy to the people, raising the awareness of our people in this sense, and exposing the enemy. The reason why we need armed propaganda, the reason why the Party initially entered the country with armed propaganda; the absence of a guerrilla organization and guerrilla warfare force and conditions that would directly implement our line of war in the country’s practice at that time. Because guerrilla warfare needs a certain mass power, a certain organization, base and infrastructure. Armed propaganda is preferred because the infrastructure for this is not established. At that time, neither guerrilla warfare nor insurrection had a basis. The people of Kurdistan do not even know our Party well enough. The consciousness of the enemy is weak, it is experiencing extreme disorganization. Politically, it is quite backward. Its contradictions, its level of organization are not suitable for a general uprising. That is, it serves to develop a long-term people’s war strategy with the guerilla style of armed propaganda due to the lack of conditions for insurrection. As a matter of fact, as it was seen in practice in the following years, armed propaganda initially led to the development of the armed struggle and gradually reaching the guerrilla, and the development of the guerrilla gradually led to civil political popular uprisings and serhildans.
FOOT SCRAPS
A few more words should be said about the importance of armed propaganda. In Russia, the Iskra newspaper has a role to play; Iskra newspaper fulfills the task of organizing, propaganda and agitation, and that it is an educational element; In this sense, we know that it is a fundamental tool in the Bolshevik organization that creates a bridge between the party and the masses. The importance and the role played by the armed propaganda we applied in Kurdistan can be compared with the importance of Iskra published in Russia in terms of the period of its use. We call the one we have “The Footed Iskra”, and it has an intense education and awareness-raising task. It is clear that in the practical process, armed propaganda operates in accordance with its function, and the developments are shaped by this activity.
Another point is that there was a newspaper, radio, etc. at that time. There is no way we can reach the masses. The literacy level of the people, their cultural level and their relations with the colonizer do not allow this. Therefore, there is only one way to reach the masses; it is to use the human element. In other words, even the smallest work must be carried out by human hands. The armed propaganda groups in us organize, agitate, propagate, base, provide logistics, develop their frontal work to its preliminary form, etc. etc. It consists of capable units capable of carrying out missions. Those who carry out this activity are already the most competent cadres of the Party. For this reason, the first serious confrontation with the enemy would be started with them, and it would have a decisive effect on the whole next process. This core would either integrate with the people who would work correctly and succeed, or if it failed, its chances of survival would be greatly diminished. In this sense, armed propaganda work is of vital importance both for our country, our people and our Party. In other words, if a new horizon was to be opened in the history of our people, if our people were to be brought together with the supreme virtues of humanity, if they were to be pulled from the darkness of millenniums and brought to the light, our armed propaganda groups would spark the first spark and initiate the truly great and inevitable moment of reckoning.
OUR PROPAGANDA ELEMENT IS THE RESISTANCE IN THE DİYARBAKIR DUNGEON
Naturally, there was an increase in the number of armed propaganda groups in the Bakur area. Now, we can call every area where these are located a state. In each state, there were 30-40 friends in the area. We were now holding open meetings with the villagers and enlightening the society on how to fight. Our only propaganda element, our argument, or most importantly, was the resistance in Diyarbakir dungeon. Although many revolutionary groups showed some resistance, the PKK quickly recovered, although it was ultimately neutralized by the fascism of September 12. It was a little bit of propaganda. This will be avenged, the movement is capable of this, it has prepared and trained itself for years, it has opportunities, the important thing is that the people should also take part, the duties and responsibilities to be made to the people,
Of course, there was excitement, the society was excited, wanted more and was happy. But as we mentioned, they also had many question marks in their minds. It was the first time he had encountered such an ambitious organization, with friends. Previous experiences and examples were not very promising. Because all rebellions, all resistances were suppressed very cruelly and the life of each rebellion and resistance lasted for a few months, the longest for a year. I wonder if those who made this propaganda for us will be liquidated in such a short time? Again, as in history, can the enemy turn to them and destroy them? What great trouble will befall us if these are liquidated? They couldn’t help but think about it. On the other hand, they were really thinking whether they could advance or enlarge this process as much as they were ambitious.
REACHING THE DECISION ON AUGUST 15
The preparation process improved a little over that. We can call this the preparation process of August 15th. Starting objectively with the 1st Conference, the education dimension was completed with our 2nd Party Congress, and with the next steps, it was in the form of establishing bases in the country and organizing armed propaganda groups with the small groups we mentioned. Of course, there have always been those who experienced the excitement and anxiety of this. Especially the suggestions, advice, accusations, concerns, etc. of groups outside of us. was happening. But Leader Apo tried to respond to all these negative situations with the perspectives, instructions, decisions and education he constantly developed, and now he had reached a certain stage of development. Work with large armed propaganda groups was also experiencing a repetition. To conduct a study in this way would be to repeat itself.
Friend Egîd was aware of this situation and was in search of it. Friends were telling, once friends in Botan go to Egîd’s friend, he is alone and they see that his morale is not very good. When friends ask why, he explains: “We cannot develop a move with our current course of action. You are too shy; We go to a village or a family, invisible to anyone during the day and very secretly at night. When we go, the family is uneasy, we are also uneasy. The family is worried so that no one will see us, and we are also worried about whether anyone has seen us. After all, we can see a person or a family every 24 hours or every two or three days. How much do we explain ourselves within that anxiety psychology, how much do they understand and give meaning to us. In one way or another, this struggle cannot bring about great progress,” he said. Friends are arguing about it. Egîd friend says that my suggestion or opinion should be to overcome this style. It is now time to combine our forces and take a place like Uludere under our control for a day or a few hours, to strike the enemy there. If this happens, both the movement’s self-confidence develops and the patriotism awareness and feeling develops. We even become those who sympathize and participate in the movement and become the authority. We really start a process. Egîd friend then says something like this. If I’m not mistaken, it is even made into a report and sent to action. Already two months later, the leadership of the movement evaluates the situation and reaches the decision to carry out the 15 August Initiative. Egîd friend says that my suggestion or opinion should be to overcome this style. It is now time to combine our forces and take a place like Uludere under our control for a day or a few hours, to strike the enemy there. If this happens, both the movement’s self-confidence develops and the patriotism awareness and feeling develops.
Let me also point this out here. Leader Apo has always told us this. The August 15 Leap Forward might actually have been earlier. If the Bashur process had been evaluated better, if time had been used better and more organized, the August 15 Initiative could have been launched a few months or even a year ago. Despite the difficulties and the impossible, this could happen. However, in the middle of 1984, at the end of the spring or in the middle of summer, the management of the movement evaluates the developments caused by the armed propaganda, the organizational situation, the interest of the people in this process, the developments in Turkey and Kurdistan, and the developments in the region. He concludes that, on the basis of existing preparations, it is now necessary and imperative to initiate a historic move.
TARGETS SET FOR BOTH DOMESTIC AND BORDER REGIONS
When this information reached us, we were with Egîd. Our suggestion was to print a place more like Uludere. Friends were based on the simultaneous printing of three places. One is Eruh. One of them is from Semdin. The other was Çatak. Eruh was a little further inland, far from the border. The reason why Eruh was chosen was to show the enemy that we have the capacity to take action and launch a move inland. Therefore, it was important to encourage the people, to highlight their patriotic feelings and to create such a psychological pressure on the enemy. Because the enemy launched an invasion movement against Bashur Kurdistan for the first time in May 1983. The propaganda argument he developed at that time was “separatist terrorist organizations are roaming along the borders, we will not keep them alive” and so on.
In this context, it should be noted that the operation started in 1983 came to naught with some blows. I mean, making this move in a place like Eruh in the interior, not over the border, would undoubtedly have an impact on the enemy. The enemy would think that they are organized in these inner areas as well, they have bases, they have public relations, they have bases, they have preparations. They have developed at this level, they are starting the war at this level. This would have an effect on the enemy. Çatak would also have such an effect. Semdinli is a little different. Patriotism was strong in Semdinli, there were some familiar patriots, relations, although there were many inadequacies before. The action in Şemdinli could have been effective in the Zagros, which we call the triangle. In this sense, these areas were determined in this way. In this way it was chosen as the target. It was indeed true. Because otherwise, the enemy would have done something that would make the weight of the movement, the meaning and importance of the action to be minimized, by making propaganda for it, like this, they came from outside and fired a few bullets and left.
YOU WILL DO WHAT GIAP DOES
Egîd, the commander of the Armed Propaganda Union of July 14, was also the friend in charge of the country. Eruh was going to carry out his planning. Friend Egîd was in intensive preparation in Botan-Eruh. It subjects the cadres to this kind of training for days. The scope and importance of the action was explained in detail to the cadres and fighters who would participate in the action. Again, there is a process of spiritual and psychological preparation. Reconnaissance, intelligence, geography, base, areas to shoot after the action, etc. in the practical area of the action. preparations were being made. Sometimes we joked in conversations. We were saying that Giap is famous, he started a struggle in Vietnam with an armed propaganda unit of 34 people. He laid the foundations of a 30-40 year long struggle against the Americans, Japanese and French. Giap was a rather short, stocky man. Egîd friend was also a little similar physically. We were telling Egîd friend that you will do what Giap did. Friend Egîd was intensely experiencing the excitement, responsibility and seriousness of this. The last time we said goodbye, we said goodbye.
The Eruh attack took place not with 34 people, but close to ten. Comrade Abdullah Ekinci, the command of the March 21 Armed Propaganda Unit, carried out the Semdinli attack on the same day and at the same time of the month with great success. May 18 Armed Propaganda Union failed to carry out the Çatak action. Terzi Cemal was responsible for this. He said it didn’t happen for various reasons, we couldn’t do it. HRK (Hêzên Rizgariya Kurdistanê) was declared as a result of the Eruh attack by the Armed Propaganda Unit on 14 July and the Şemdinli attack by the Armed Propaganda Unit on 21 March. The aforementioned actions, which dealt serious blows to the genocidal-colonial state forces and made public propaganda, had a great impact in every field.
Leader Apo was told by friends that he was in great anxiety and a great emotional intensity until he got the news on the night of the protest, and when he heard that the protest was successful, he took a deep breath and said “we succeeded”. When the death fast decision was taken in Amed dungeon, friend Hayri’s word ‘we succeeded’ was carried over to the mountains this time with the 15th of August Breakthrough. The flag of resistance would now fly over the mountain peaks. Already, the preparations for the 15 August action were developed through the spirit of July 14 resistance, the resistance of the Oppressed and the Four. Therefore, the victory flag of the dungeon resistance, whose duties and responsibilities were fulfilled with great honor and success in the face of history and society, would now fly on the peaks of the mountains. In this sense, on August 15, 1984, a new page was opened in the history of Kurdistan and a new beginning was made.
THE KURDISTAN REVOLUTION IS STILL CONTINUING
Leader Apo did not reduce the victory of the 15 August Initiative to a mere armed struggle, but always handled and valued it beyond that. He always cared about the ideological dimension, the policy and strategy, tactics, the possibilities that will emerge in international relations, the effect on the enemy, the level of influence on the society, and evaluated it from a historical perspective. After August 15, nothing has been the same. The enemy came upon our movement with great fury. At that time they were saying: they have one day’s life, we will finish it in 72 hours, their end has come, they were surrounded by incredible psychological pressure and really mobilizing all his strength, he was acting with the complacency given by him, inspired by history. But when he realized that the situation was not like that at all, this time he saw the gravity and seriousness of the situation.
After 15 August in fact the enemy was unresponsive for several weeks. They were stationed, motionless. But the revolutionary movement was also inexperienced and did not make move after move. Friends were also acting cautiously, wondering how they would come against us. While the friends were trying to understand what the enemy was thinking and what he wanted to do, the enemy was motionless, worried and worried about what kind of attacks would be behind this great historical move. Such a situation occurred for a short time.
The people, on the other hand, evaluated this process well. There were those who told friends that it was a revolution. They were saying to the soldiers who came to the village, why are you here, and about the soldiers who returned immediately. A group of friends was telling the following: On the evening of August 15, they went to the coaches in the highlands and gathered everyone in the light of the bell and read the 15 August declaration to young people, women and men. When the BBC gave the news of Eruh and Şemdinli, those who danced zılgıt, danced halay and lived their enthusiasm and excitement until the morning. It had such an enthusiasm and impact on the people and society. The important thing was to develop this move further and to ensure continuity.
For August 15, some called it “the first bullet in the dark”. Some called it “the beginning of the Kurdistan revolution”. Some called it “the moment when the walls of fear come down”. Some called it “the demolition of the sovereign outposts in the mentality”. They were all very meaningful and valuable descriptions. All were true. The enemy also began to understand the nature of the move and what the party wanted to do. He, too, started to make all his preparations by thinking more strategically rather than briefly. Our strategy at that time in the movement was a long-term people’s war strategy. It was an introduction, a beginning. Conditions in Kurdistan were different. It was not a revolution that would take place in two years like the Sierra Maestra in Cuba. Besides Vietnamese patriotism, the personality created by the enemy on Kurdistan society, The assimilation and integration he practiced were very, very different. China was not. The conditions of the Kurdistan revolution were different, it was a revolution with its own important features and difficulties. Its great importance comes from here, and it still continues.
